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The last 20-30 years have seen two “scientific revolutions” in the study of ani-
mal behavior: the cognitive revolution that originated in psychology, and the 
Darwinian, behavioral ecology revolution that originated in biology. Among 
psychologists, the cognitive revolution has had enormous impact. Similarly, 
among biologists, the Darwinian revolution has had enormous impact. The ma-
jor theme of this chapter is that these two scientific research programs need to 
be combined into a single approach, simultaneously cognitive and Darwinian, 
and that this single approach is most appropriately called cognitive ethology. 
Scientific progress 
What constitutes progress in science? At one level, there is substantial agree-
ment: progress consists of the testing of specific alternative hypotheses that re-
sults in the rejection of most of these hypotheses. It can be argued that, in the 
long run, all will be rejected. This is the concept of falsification, perhaps best ex-
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pressed for the working scientist by the process called strong inference (Platt, 
1964), in which multiple hypotheses are generated and experiments designed 
to disprove as many of them as possible. 
However, at another level, the falsificationist position is incorrect. Major 
high-level theories, such, as those of Newtonian physics, Ptolemaic astronomy, 
Lorenzian ethology or radical behaviorism are not rejected on the basis of one, 
or even a few, facts or experiments that are inconsistent with them. The pro-
cess of strong inference does not apply with hypotheses/theories at this level of 
generality. 
Some philosophers (e.g. Kuhn, 1970; Lakatos, 1974) have provided alternative 
accounts of how scientific progress occurs at these levels. The work of Kuhn is 
particularly familiar to many scientists. In his book titled The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions, Kuhn (1970) argued that the falsificationist view is incorrect, demon-
strating that changes in broad theories, which he called scientific paradigms, do 
not occur according to the falsificationist model. Unfortunately, Kuhn failed to 
specify clearly how the process of change from one paradigm to another, or sci-
entific revolution in his words, takes place. Kuhn makes it sound like a genera-
tional or sociological phenomenon, not necessarily related to data at all. 
Another philosopher of science, less well known outside philosophical cir-
cles, Imre Lakatos (1974), has extended the arguments of Kuhn in a particu-
larly useful way, providing a cogent analysis of how paradigmatic changes that 
do address the issue of the relationship between broad scientific theories and 
data take place. Lakatos argues that science is characterized by what he calls re-
search programs, roughly equivalent to Kuhn’s scientific paradigms. A research 
program consists of two parts: a central “hard core” and a protective belt of spe-
cific auxiliary hypotheses. The central core consists of definitions and assump-
tions that coherently map out directions for research, but this core is not subject 
to direct test. Instead, the auxiliary hypotheses are used to derive specific mod-
els and hypotheses, which are subject to empirical test, revision and rejection. 
Lakatos uses an amusing fictional anecdote to illustrate the difference be-
tween the hard core of a research program and its surrounding web of auxiliary 
hypotheses. Imagine a pre-Einsteinian physicist who uses the central core of his 
scientific program, Newton’s mechanics and the law of gravity, to calculate the 
path of a newly discovered planet, p. However, observation of the planet shows 
that its orbit deviates from the predicted one. Does the physicist abandon New-
tonian physics? No. He revises his auxiliary hypotheses, and calculates that 
there is another, previously unknown planet, p′, which disturbs the orbit of p. 
This is a new model, which is subjected to test by building a large new tele-
scope to look for p′. Suppose p′ is found. It would be considered a great victory 
for Newtonian physics. Why? — because it would be the discovery of a new, 
previously unexpected fact, implying that Newtonian physics was a progres-
sive research program. But suppose p′ was not observed. The physicist would 
still not abandon the central core of Newtonian physics. He might modify his 
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model again, predicting that there is a cloud of dust located so as to obscure the 
view of supposed planet p′. This new model could then be tested by sending a 
satellite to collect data to determine if the cloud of dust existed, and so on. 
So how does change from one scientific research program to another take 
place? Lakatos distinguishes two types of programs: degenerate and progressive. 
A progressive program is one that is resulting in the discovery of new, previ-
ously unknown facts. It may also be able to explain facts long known but previ-
ously not understood. In contrast, a degenerate program is one that is not produc-
ing new discoveries, but only reiterating old ones. Given a choice between these 
two types of programs, Lakatos argues, most scientists will choose the exciting, 
progressive program over the dull, degenerate program. The major advantage of 
Lakatos’ approach over Kuhn’s is that the formulation of Lakatos specifies a re-
lationship between evidence and scientific revolutions. The paradigm or research 
program that is leading to exciting new discoveries is the one that will prevail. 
This approach to understanding scientific progress suggests that science 
progresses in two ways. A specific research program is developed and refined 
through the falsification of specific hypotheses and models that are derived 
within that program. However, choice of research program is made on a dif-
ferent basis, in terms of the overall usefulness of the research generated by the 
central core of the program. In this context, usefulness is defined as the discov-
ery of new facts or the novel explanation of phenomena that are known, but 
have not been previously understood. 
Thus, Newtonian physics did not fall because of some experiments that pro-
duced results it could not explain (as a falsificationist would have us believe), 
nor did it fall because Einsteinian physics won some kind of cultural battle (as 
some naïve followers of Kuhn would have us believe). Newtonian physics fell 
to Einsteinian physics because Einstein’s theory predicted a host of new phe-
nomena and explained known, but previously unexplainable, phenomena, and 
it is in these terms that the cognitive and the Darwinian research programs 
have come to prevail. Each program has generated new sets of auxiliary hy-
potheses and, in the process of testing these hypotheses (and discarding and 
refining them as research proceeded), many new and unexpected phenomena 
have been uncovered. 
The cognitive research program 
It is clear that the study of cognitive processes in animals has emerged as a ma-
jor field of study. There has been an explosion of interest in the approach, as in-
dicated, for example, by the number of books devoted to the subject, beginning 
with Roitblat et al. (1984) through to the present (Vauclair, 1996; Roberts, 1998; 
Shettleworth, 1998). As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, many phe-
nomena have been approached from the cognitive perspective. These include 
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phenomena traditionally studied by ethologists (e.g. bird song; Kroodsma and 
Byers, Todt and Hultsch, this volume) as well as those more traditionally asso-
ciated with psychologists (e.g. timing; Gibbon and Church, 1990). While the ap-
proach originated with experimental psychologists, it has also proven to be of 
great interest to neurophysiologists (e.g. O’Keefe and Nadel, 1978) and biolo-
gists (e.g. Real, 1994; Dukas, 1998). As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, 
it is a very diverse field, with investigators examining phenomena as different 
as spatial navigation in honey bees, birds and mammals, the perception and 
production of auditory signals, the comprehension and use of symbolic com-
munication systems. This diversity is a sign of one strength of the approach - 
the cognitive approach is applicable to a wide variety of phenomena in many 
different taxa. However, the field of animal cognition also appears to be frag-
mented, lacking a central definition. This can be seen in the many different la-
bels that are used: animal cognition, comparative cognition, cognitive ecology, 
cognitive ethology, etc. 
Another sign of the fragmentation of the field is the absence of a widely ac-
cepted definition of animal cognition. Many texts on animal cognition actually 
avoid explicit definition, tending to define cognition by example, as the study 
of certain types of processes such as attention, memory, etc. However, if we ap-
ply the lessons of Lakatos, we see that animal cognition is not the study of cer-
tain phenomena, it is an approach to a set of problems. 
In these terms, then, how should the cognitive research program be charac-
terized? Although it can be phrased in a number of ways, the central assump-
tion of the cognitive program is that organisms possess some type of internal 
representation of the external world. Examples include cognitive maps, tem-
plates or internal images, but simpler ideas such as memories might also be in-
cluded. These internal representations are related to the external world in two 
ways: a coding process on the input side and a relationship to behavior on the 
output side. Many of the alternative hypotheses we test have to do with these 
input-output relationships between the assumed internal representations and 
the external world. As Dyer (1994) put it, cognitive approaches, in contrast to 
noncognitive approaches “… postulate processes that organize sensory infor-
mation into coherent internal models of external events, allowing the animal 
to respond appropriately to important stimuli even when experiencing them in 
novel combinations or contexts” (p. 68). 
Reasons for fragmentation 
Disciplinary diversity 
Despite this central theme, the study of animal cognition is, as noted above, 
fairly fragmented. One of the reasons for this fragmentation is disciplinary di-
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versity. The students of animal cognition come from distinct disciplinary back-
grounds. These different disciplines focus on animal cognition in different ways 
and for different reasons. Furthermore, these disciplines operate within very 
different research programs or paradigms making different assumptions and 
having different goals. That is, even in cases where researchers share the central 
assumptions of the cognitive program, they also are participants in other re-
search programs, which leads to diversity of questions, approaches and goals. 
The relationship between human and nonhuman cognition 
One large difference among those taking a cognitive approach with animals is 
whether they are oriented primarily towards understanding humans, using an-
imals as model systems, or are more oriented towards understanding the an-
imals within a biological context. Shettleworth (1993) expressed it well, dis-
tinguishing between what she called the “anthropocentric program” and the 
“ecological program” (see Table 1). 
Specialized vs. general dichotomy 
Another problem which has haunted the study of animal cognition is the dis-
tinction between specialized and general processes. Historically, this has been a 
biology-psychology dichotomy. Psychologists tended to emphasize the search 
Table 1. Comparison of the Anthropocentric and Ecological Programs (after Shettleworth, 
1993). 
Characteristic  Anthropocentric program Ecological program 
Purpose  Investigate continuity and  Investigate impact of 
  generality of cognitive  evolution on cognition;
  processes across species  understand cognition as a  
  biological phenomenon 
 
Phenomena  Animal cognition in tasks Cognitive processes that 
 analyzed  modeled on what people do  animals use in nature 
Species compared  Human vs. nonhuman  Close relatives with  
 (often implicit);  divergent niches;   
 distantly related species  distant relatives with  
  convergent niches 
Relationship to  Evidence of continuity Understanding evolution  
 neuroscience  needed to justify of brain mechanisms; 
 “animal models”  interpreting adaptive  
  specializations as modifi- 
  cations of general processes 
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for a few general process “mechanisms” that could explain a very wide vari-
ety of phenomena. In contrast, biologists interested in animal cognition tended 
to be interested in cases where cognitive processing seemed to be devoted to 
a single (or restricted set of) biological problem(s). The study of imprinting or 
song learning (at least in the early days) epitomized this approach. 
Current state of affairs 
In summary, then, the cognitive research program has proved to be an excit-
ing, progressive one. As many of the chapters in this volume make clear, work-
ing within the cognitive paradigm has proved quite productive, leading to 
many exciting, often unexpected results. However, the field is characterized by 
a number of divisions, mostly related to different investigators working within 
different traditions and at different levels of analysis in an uncoordinated man-
ner. What is needed is a more comprehensive and inclusive research program 
which will allow integration across these divisions. 
The ethological program 
It is interesting to compare this state of affairs with the dilemma facing those 
studying animal behavior in the 1950s and 1960s. As is the case with animal 
cognition today, there were many different workers from different disciplines 
involved, and efforts to understand animal behavior were diverse and diffuse. 
At least four approaches were present: 
1. The “classical” ethological approach of Lorenz, which emphasizes phyloge-
netic relationships and genetic contributions to behavior. 
2. The “British” school of ethology, which is oriented more towards adaptation. 
3. The American behaviorist tradition, with its emphasis on learning and 
reinforcement. 
4. The Schnierla-Lehrman approach, emphasizing epigenesis and experience in 
the broad sense. 
There was considerable disagreement and confusion about how to reconcile 
these approaches. Especially problematic was the question of the relationship 
between evolutionary and mechanistic levels of analysis. 
A major event in the resolution of these problems was the publication of Tin-
bergen’s (1963) famous paper “On aims and methods of ethology.” In that pa-
per, and throughout his work and career, Tinbergen emphasized the necessity 
of understanding behavior at different levels, in terms of phylogeny (histori-
cal), adaptation (function), mechanism (neuroscience) and development (on-
togeny). One way to express Tinbergen’s position is that it called for the inte-
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grated study of these four levels of analysis. Another way to express it is that 
it encouraged the study of ontogeny and mechanism within a Darwinian per-
spective, including considerations of phylogeny and adaptation. However it is 
phrased, it is clear that the integrative, multilevel approach called for by Tin-
bergen (and others) has been successful. Today, the study of animal behavior, 
encompassing ethology, behavioral ecology and comparative psychology, is a 
much more integrated and cohesive field. 
This has taken place because students of animal behavior now largely agree 
on a scientific research program sensu Lakatos. The central core of this program 
is the assumption that every behavior has an evolutionary history, a biologi-
cal function, an underlying neural mechanism and a developmental history, 
and that these interact in many ways. This central core has produced a field of 
study that is a vibrant field, much different than the field of animal behavior 
of the 1950s and 1960s. Many of the old disciplinary distinctions have largely 
fallen away. Today, there are biologists in psychology departments, and psy-
chologists in biology departments; there are truly interdisciplinary programs 
in which departmental or disciplinary affiliation is relatively unimportant, like 
those at Davis, Indiana and Nebraska. But, most important, it has proven to 
be a most progressive research program. Any contemporary animal behavior 
text will give many examples of exciting new findings generated by the multi-
level, integrative approach advocated so well by Niko Tinbergen. Examples in-
clude research programs incorporating the study of sensory processes into un-
derstanding natural and sexual selection (Endler, 1980; Basolo, 1995), programs 
using comparative and phylogenetic approaches to understand foraging pref-
erences (Arnold, 1981), or sexual behavior (Ryan and Rand, 1995), or programs 
integrating optimization models based on the concept of adaptedness with the 
study of behavioral mechanisms (Cuthill and Houston, 1997). 
Synthesis 
The major theme of this chapter is that the modern ethological approach and 
the cognitive approach need to be synthesized. On the one hand, the etholog-
ical program, strongly evolutionary but emphasizing the importance of mech-
anism and ontogeny, provides a powerful, pragmatic framework for the study 
of animal cognition. Those interested in cognition need to view their work in 
the broad integrative ethological framework. On the other hand, the cognitive 
research program provides a potent rubric for understanding many of the com-
plexities that are found in the behavior of animals. Those interested in animal 
behavior can, in many cases, benefit from taking a cognitive approach in trying 
to understand the behaviors they study. 
There are a number of research programs which have adopted this synthetic 
approach, such as those on spatial memory in seed-caching corvids (Kamil and 
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Balda, 1990; Balda and Kamil, this volume) and parids (Shettleworth and Hamp-
ton, Clayton and Lee, this volume), studies of homing and navigation in birds 
and bees (Wiltschko and Wiltschko, Bingman et al., and Dyer, this volume) and 
of song learning (Todt and Hultsch, Kroodsma and Byers, De Voogt and Szekely, 
this volume). As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, each of the four ques-
tions Tinbergen (1963) identified can be asked about animal cognition. 
Physiological mechanism 
An animal’s internal representations of the external world must have their 
physical bases in the brain, and understanding the neural bases of cognition 
will be an essential component of fully understanding cognition in animals 
(and humans). Chapters in this volume, for example, discuss the role of the hip-
pocampus in spatial memory, and the neural bases of song learning and navi-
gation. This work is interesting, with many important implications, but there is 
a basic problem at present integrating neurobiological techniques and knowl-
edge with behavioral cognitive studies. 
The problem is that our behavioral knowledge of cognitive capabilities, ru-
dimentary though it may be in many respects, is still more advanced than our 
neurobiological knowledge. For example, we know that species differences in 
hippocampal volume, adjusted for body or total brain size, correlate with depen-
dence on cached food in parids and corvids (Krebs et al., 1989; Sherry et at., 1989), 
and especially in the case of seed-caching corvids, with performance on a vari-
ety of test of spatial cognition (Basil et at., 1996). However, hippocampal volume 
is a very global, unsatisfactory measure. It would be most helpful if more fine-
grained measures could be developed. For example, work with mammals has 
demonstrated the existence of so-called “place neurons,” neurons which fire only 
when the animal is in a specific place (different places having different neurons). 
Do seed-caching birds like nutcrackers and black-capped chickadees have more 
place neurons than other birds, and is that why their hippocampi are larger? 
Recent developments in neurobiology indicate that many new techniques 
are being developed which will contribute substantially to our understanding 
of animal cognition by providing more detailed information about the neurobi-
ology of cognition. For example, the positron emission tomography (PET) scans 
are beginning to reveal much about which parts of the brain are active dur-
ing different cognitive tasks, such as recall (Schacter, 1996). Also, immunocyto-
chemistry is beginning to provide detailed information about neural circuitry 
(e.g. Szekely and Krebs, 1996). 
Developmental processes 
The cognitive processes of animals are strongly influenced by ontogeny. This 
has been particularly well studied in development of song learning since 
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the pioneering work of Marler (Marler and Tamura, 1964; Todt and Hultsch, 
Kroodsma and Byers, this volume). Seed caching and navigation provide ad-
ditional examples (Clayton and Lee; Wiltschko and Wiltschko, this volume). In 
these cases, the ontogenetic effects seem to have clear targets. That is, the ef-
fects of varied experience, at least as they have been studied, are found in rel-
atively specific domains. However, it is possible that ontogenetic effects may 
have broader, less specific impact. 
Perhaps the most suggestive evidence of general effects of ontogeny comes 
from the work of Rosenzweig and his collaborators (e.g. Bennett and Rosenz-
weig, 1981). They have shown that differences in early environment have dra-
matic behavioral and neurobiological effects in rats, including anatomical and 
biochemical effects on the brain. These results imply that there is much more 
to be learned about the ontogeny of animal cognition, and that it will pay divi-
dends to combine developmental, behavioral, and neurobiological approaches. 
Clayton and Lee’s research (this volume) provides an excellent example of 
such work. They studied the development of spatial memory and hippocam-
pal growth in storing and nonstoring parids. As they describe in their chap-
ter, they found that hippocampal growth was facilitated by the opportunity to 
cache, but only in the caching species. 
It is possible that these effects found by Clayton and Lee are indicators of 
more general effects. Consider what we know about ontogeny, neurobiology 
and spatial memory in seed-caching corvids. Young nutcrackers spend consid-
erable time accompanying their parents recovering seeds, and engage in “play-
like” cache-recovery behavior (Vander Wall and Hutchins, 1983). Dimmick 
(1993) found that adult, wild-caught nutcrackers recovered their caches more 
accurately than young nutcrackers under controlled laboratory conditions. This 
is consistent with the possibility of important ontogenetic effects in the develop-
ment of spatial memory in nutcrackers. Basil et al. (1996) found that nutcrackers 
have larger hippocampi (adjusted for total brain size) than Pinyon Jays, Scrub 
Jays, or Mexican Jays, which are all corvids less dependent on cached food than 
nutcrackers. It is possible that the early experience effects suggested by Dim-
mick’s work are expressed in increased hippocampal growth, as suggested by 
the findings of Basil et al. 
Comparative experiments suggest even more. Balda and Kamil (1989) 
found that nutcrackers and Pinyon Jays recover caches more accurately than 
Scrub Jays. Furthermore, in a series of studies involving noncaching tests of 
spatial memory, Balda, Kamil and their coworkers have found consistent spe-
cies differences in spatial memory that parallel the results of the comparative 
cache-recovery experiment (Olson, 1991; Kamil et al., 1994; Olson et al., 1995). 
Dimmick’s (1993) results suggest that early experience may play an impor-
tant role in the development of the cache site memory abilities of nutcrackers 
and other seed-caching corvids. These results may not be limited to cache re-
covery. It would be most interesting if experiments examining the behavioral 
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and neurobiological effects of differential early experience, and including a 
battery of tests of spatial memory, were carried out. Such experiments might 
well reveal general effects of early experience both spatial memory and hip-
pocampal size. 
Adaptive Function
The discussion of the analysis of the ontogenetic and neurobiological substrates 
of cognitive processes has been relatively brief. These approaches ‘e relatively 
well established and do not need lengthy discussion. However, analysis of cog-
nition in an evolutionary framework, emphasizing both phylogeny and adapta-
tion, faces some serious unresolved problems. Taking functional analysis first, 
we know that cognitive processes can have adaptive outcomes: remembering 
where food has been stored, singing effective songs, finding the way back to 
the hive. However, there are some special difficulties the study of behavior as 
adaptation. It might be worthwhile to review the methods that have been used 
to test ideas about behavior as adaptation and discuss the potential for the ap-
plication of these methods within the cognitive paradigm.
Correlational Approach
One way to investigate the possible adaptive significance of a trait is to measure 
biological success (or some correlated variable) as a function of that trait. Most 
often, the results of such a study are in the form of a correlation. A classic case 
is provided by studies of the role of avian helpers at the nest. It was well known 
that in many species of birds, older offspring remained around the nest when 
subsequent broods were raised, often engaging in what eared to be helpful be-
havior, such as feeding the young in the new brood (Scutch, 1961). The ques-
tion that arose was whether this was actually helping behavior. That is, did the 
behavior of the helping birds actually increase the number of young raised per 
nest? The first studies to investigate this issue showed that there was, in many 
species, a positive correlation between the presence of helpers and the number 
of young successfully fledged (e.g. Rowley, 1965; see Brown, 1987, esp. pp. 169-
173, for review). 
As far as I know, this correlational approach has never been attempted any 
cognitive trait. The practical problem appears to be the difficulty obtaining a 
good measure of cognitive ability without disrupting the animal g studied. 
For example, it seems quite reasonable to assume that a seed-caching bird that 
more accurately remembers its cache sites will recover e food when needed 
and, therefore, survive and reproduce more successfully. However, this idea 
needs to be tested directly. It would be very resting to know if individual nut-
crackers, Pinyon Jays or Marsh Tits with better cache site memories actually 
do enjoy higher degrees of biological success than those with poorer mem-
ories. However, performing this research would require capturing and test-
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ing many birds, then releasing them and collecting data on reproductive suc-
cess. While possible, this approach would actually be very difficult to carry 
out successfully. 
Another possibility might be found in cases where measures of cognitive 
ability might be obtainable from free-living animals. For example, Healy and 
Hurly (1995) have developed a method for testing hummingbirds on a spatial 
learning and memory task under field conditions. In essence, they used artificial 
feeders to set up an analog of the radial maze task widely used with rats. The 
free-flying hummingbirds had to keep track of which feeders in the array they 
had visited and avoid revisits to these emptied flowers on a subsequent visit. 
This is quite analogous to a problem that nectar feeders face in nature (Gill and 
Wolf, 1977). Healy and Hurly found not only that the birds learned the task, but 
that there were considerable individual differences in performance. Repeat vis-
its to already emptied flowers can have quite significant effects on food intake 
(Kamil, 1978). It would be particularly interesting to see if the individual dif-
ferences observed by Healy and Hurly (1995) might correlate with a direct or 
indirect measure of fitness, such as rate of fat accumulation during pauses in 
migration. 
Experimental approach 
Although the correlational approach can produce useful and important infor-
mation, it has a basic weakness: it only produces a correlation and correlation 
does not prove causation. The fact that the number of young fledged is corre-
lated with the number of helpers could be due to some third variable which 
correlates with both variables. For example, territorial quality could influence 
both factors, causing helpers to stay on better territories, which, by their very 
nature, also produce more young regardless of the number of helpers. This 
problem can be avoided by manipulating the variable of interest experimen-
tally, with individual animals assigned to conditions at random. Then, if an ef-
fect is found, we can be more certain of the causal relationship between the trait 
and biological success. Thus, in the case of helpers at the nest, it is possible to 
identify a set of territories with equivalent numbers of helpers present and then 
experimentally remove helpers from some nests, selected at random. Such ex-
perimental studies have confirmed the hypothesis that, at least in some species, 
the presence of helpers at the nest does increase the number of young fledged 
(Brown et al 1982). 
There are three ways that this approach could be applied to cognition. 
1. Using neurobiological techniques to interfere with a cognitive ability. One 
way is to interfere with the cognitive ability by lesioning animals and observ-
ing the effects on free-ranging animals. Krushinskaya (1966) performed hippo-
campal lesions on free-ranging Eurasian Nutcrackers and found that the lesions 
impaired their ability to relocate their stored food. However, lesions represent a 
fairly crude manipulation and raise serious ethical concerns. It is possible that, 
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as neurobiological techniques advance, finer and more detailed methods of in-
terfering with cognitive abilities by disrupting the neural substrate may well 
become available. If so, these may offer greater promise scientifically as well as 
reducing the ethical concerns raised by the lesioning techniques. 
2. Using a lack of the opportunity to learn as a simulation of inability to 
learn. For example, Hollis (1984) has examined the effects of associative learn-
ing on aggressive behavior. Male Blue Gouramis (Trichogaster trichopterus) were 
conditioned to a red light. Whenever the red light came on, it was followed by 
the appearance (behind a clear partition) of another male. Control fish received 
no such conditioning. In the critical test, Hollis placed a conditioned male on 
one side of an opaque partition; an unconditioned male on the other side. Af-
ter the red light, which was visible to both fish, came on, the partition was re-
moved. The conditioned fish won most of the ensuing aggressive encounters, 
showing higher levels of aggressive behavior than the controls. One way of in-
terpreting these data is that the behavior of the control represents the behavior 
that might be expected from a fish exposed to the same conditioning as the ex-
perimental males, but without the ability to learn the association. In this light, 
these experiments demonstrate an approach to simulating the behavior of an-
imals without specific cognitive abilities to investigate the possible adaptive 
value of those abilities. More recently, this work has been extended to show 
that when the conditioned stimulus predicted the appearance of a receptive fe-
male, conditioned male gouramis had distinct paternal advantage over noncon-
ditioned males (Hollis et al 1997). 
3. Providing special learning experience to free-ranging animals. Another 
possibility might be to provide special training experiences and to observe po-
tential effects on biological success. For example, several studies of nectar-feed-
ing birds have shown that they increase foraging efficiency by avoiding flow-
ers which they have already emptied (Gill and Wolf, 1977; Kamil, 1978). Cole 
et al (1982) found that adult-caught hummingbirds could learn to avoid revis-
iting artificial flowers more rapidly than they could learn to revisit them. How-
ever, Wunderle and Martinez (1987) found that laboratory-raised nectar-feed-
ing bananaquits did not show this bias, although wild-caught adults did. This 
suggests that the avoidance of visited flowers may be learned. It would be in-
teresting to observe the effects of inexhaustible nectar feeders on the foraging 
patterns of young free-flying birds. 
This approach might be well suited to research with insects. Insects show 
many types of learning (Papaj and Lewis, 1993) and, with their relatively short 
life spans, research on the lifetime fitness effects of early experience might be 
particularly practicable. For example, Heinrich and his collaborators (Heinrich 
et al., 1977; Waddington et al., 1981) have found experiential effects on flower 
choice by bumblebees. It might be possible to arrange various early experiences 
for bees, then observe the effects of these experiences on later foraging success. 
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Comparative approaches 
In this approach, species are chosen for study based upon their natural history 
and phylogeny, taking advantage of the processes of divergence and conver-
gence. Divergence refers to differences among closely related species owing 
to differences in their natural histories and adaptations, while convergence re-
fers to similarities among distantly related species owing to similarities in their 
natural histories and adaptations. There are many examples of the use of these 
strategies with nonbehavioral and behavioral traits. The classic case in behav-
ior is the study of the effects of cliff nesting in sea birds. Most gulls nest on the 
ground, but a few, including Kittiwakes, nest on very narrow ledges on steep 
cliff faces. Many of the behaviors of Kittiwakes differ from those of ground-
nesting gulls in ways that seem sensibly related to cliff nesting. For example, 
Kittiwake adults, unlike other gulls, show weaker reactions to predators, do not 
remove eggshells and droppings from around nests and do not learn to recog-
nize their young, at least in the first 4 weeks after hatching. Kittiwake chicks do 
not run when attacked, and show much less movement around the nest (Cul-
len, 1957). These appear to be reasonable adaptations to cliff nesting, but how is 
this adaptive hypothesis to be tested? 
One way to test it would be to examine the behaviors of other cliff-nesting 
sea birds. If the hypothesis is correct, many similarities should be found. Stud-
ies of the Black Noddy (Cullen and Ashmole, 1963) and the Galapagos Swal-
low-tailed Gull (Hailman, 1965) generally supported the hypothesis. These two 
cliff-nesting species also diverged from their close relatives who are ground 
nesters in a manner similar to those by which the Kittiwake differs from its 
ground-nesting relatives. 
The comparative strategy seems quite appropriate for empirical analysis of 
questions about the adaptive function of cognitive abilities. However, there is a 
fundamental problem that confronts the study of cognitive processes in a com-
parative framework, the learning-performance problem (Kamil, 1988). That is, 
although we are interested in measuring learning abilities or cognitive abilities 
in our experiments, all we are ever able to measure directly is behavior, and 
the behavior we observe is a function of many factors besides cognitive abil-
ity. Therefore, whenever we obtain a difference between species in their perfor-
mance on a cognitive task, how can we be sure that the difference truly repre-
sents a difference in cognitive ability? 
For example, Balda and Kamil (1989) found that Clark’s Nutcrackers and 
Pinyon Jays recovered their caches more accurately than Scrub Jays in a labora-
tory situation. This difference might be the result of a species difference in spa-
tial cognition but it might also be due to effects of some parameter of the exper-
iment that was inadvertently ill-suited to Scrub Jays. It is quite possible that, 
under only slightly different conditions (e.g. different room layouts, motiva-
tional conditions, etc.), Scrub Jays would have performed much better. 
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Bitterman (1965) was the first to point out this problem. He suggested a 
technique, which he called control by systematic variation, to solve it. The basic 
idea was to carry out a series of experiments parametrically testing the effects 
of each potential variable that might have adversely affected the species that 
performed poorly. These variables were called contextual variables (Macphail, 
1985). Although logical, this idea faces a serious problem: it is impossible to test 
all such variables. A researcher attempting to use control by systematic varia-
tion is placed in the position of trying to prove the null hypothesis, that there 
are no conditions under which the species will be equivalent. 
I have suggested an alternative strategy based on the concept of converg-
ing operations (Kamil, 1988). The basic idea of this strategy is to test the spe-
cies in question with a battery of different tests of the same cognitive ability. 
If a pattern of species differences holds across a wide variety of tasks, involv-
ing different environments, this would provide fairly convincing evidence that 
the difference was due to the aspects that the tasks had in common, namely the 
cognitive ability under test. 
This is the strategy we have followed in comparative studies of spatial mem-
ory in seed-caching corvids. After obtaining the species difference in cache-re-
covery accuracy (Balda and Kamil, 1989), we proceeded to test the species in 
other settings, including an open room analog of the radial maze (Kamil et al., 
1994) and tests in operant chambers (Olson, 1991; Olson et al., 1995). The ba-
sic pattern of species differences held across all of these experiments. Although 
one could still argue for some confounding variable, it would have to be one 
that was present across all of these very diverse tasks. 
In thinking about these results, particularly just how strong an argument 
they actually present for the existence of differences among these species, two 
weaknesses in the Kamil (1988) paper have become apparent. The first is that 
there is an alternative hypothesis that needs to be tested, namely that the spe-
cies differences observed are not due to a specific difference in cognitive abil-
ities, but rather to some general factor. For example, nutcrackers may simply 
be more adaptable to the laboratory than other species. The second is that, al-
though the use of converging operations may weaken the argument from con-
textual variables, it does not eliminate it. These considerations indicate that an 
additional step is needed. 
This additional step might be called differentiation. It involves designing an 
experiment to be as similar as possible to those demonstrating species differ-
ences through converging operations, but testing a different cognitive ability. 
In the case of the work we have done with seed-caching corvids, there was an 
obvious possibility, the operant tests. Olson’s (1991) original demonstration of 
differences in an operant setting used a task known as spatial nonmatching to 
sample. In this task, the animal is required to remember the spatial location of 
a briefly illuminated spot, then later avoid pecking it. It was relatively easy to 
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design an experiment virtually identical to that of Olson except that the color 
of the illuminated spot was what needed to be remembered, not its spatial lo-
cation. When we carried out this experiment (Olson et al., 1995), we found that 
the ordering of the species was completely different, and that none of the spe-
cies differences was significant. These data demonstrate that the differences we 
obtained during spatial tasks are not general across all tasks. They also rule out 
most contextual variables— if contextual variables were responsible for the dif-
ferences originally found in spatial tasks, those same variables should have re-
sulted in species differences in this experiment (see Lefebvre and Giraldeau, 
1996, for a somewhat different approach). 
Taken together, these experiments provide convincing evidence of a set of 
differences in cognitive abilities that correlate with a feature of natural history, 
dependence on stored seeds. They also demonstrate one of the major disad-
vantages of the comparative approach: the necessity to conduct a research pro-
gram, not one or two experiments. However, hypotheses about the adaptive 
significance of behavior are never easy to test. 
When is cognition adaptive? The problem of cost 
One interesting aspect of the analysis of cognition in an adaptive framework 
is the exploration of the question, “When does it pay to possess a cognitive 
ability?.” Relatively little formal theoretical or empirical work has been car-
ried out looking at this basic question. The work that has been done, how-
ever, suggests this will be a fruitful area for further exploration. For example, 
Stephens (1991) has modeled the effects of within and between generational 
stability on the adaptedness of learning. He did this with a model in which 
the environment varied between good and bad states within and between 
generations, and learning genotypes competed with nonlearning genotypes. 
He found that the learning genotype would prevail only under some circum-
stances. Furthermore, the range of circumstances under which learners out-
competed nonlearners was more restricted when the learning mechanism had 
a cost associated with it. 
Although the question of the cost of learning has received little formal ex-
ploration, one basic piece of information we already have tells us that cognitive 
abilities have costs. How do we know that? Well, first of all, the cognitive abili-
ties of animals are limited. As Fred Dyer put it in his abstract for the symposium 
on the evolution of animal cognition held in Flagstaff, AZ, from which many 
chapters in this volume originated: “Why do animals not remember more, learn 
faster, or perform tasks with less error than we observe them doing?” For ex-
ample, even the best Clark’s Nutcracker forgets some of its cache sites, i.e. its 
memory ability is limited. This only makes sense if we assume that the ability 
to perform better, to remember more sites for instance, would entail some costs. 
Presumably, the development of increased ability would entail carrying around 
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more neural tissue, with an accompanying increased metabolic load. This argu-
ment implies that the cost of the extra memory capacity is greater than the cost 
of storing some extra seeds to compensate for memory loss. Without a method 
for directly assessing the costs, the concept is difficult to test. 
Another sort of evidence that suggests cognitive costs are the biases we find 
in learning, such as those shown in the well-known phenomenon of taste-aver-
sion learning. It is much easier for many animals to learn an association be-
tween certain pairs of stimuli, such as a taste and illness for example, than be-
tween other pairs, such as a sound or a light and illness. One way to look at 
this situation is that the animal experiences a constant stream of stimulation. 
When a particularly significant event, such as illness, occurs, why does the an-
imal’s internal representation of the stimuli preceding the event not include all 
of the stimuli? One answer would be as suggested above: it is too expensive in 
terms of the neuronal substrate required. However, another answer is that in-
appropriate learning could occur. This is, sounds and lights are not usually re-
liable indicators of illness, and forming such associations might be maladap-
tive. This example may have broad implications: perhaps one of the costs of 
learning is that, under some circumstances, if certain kinds of associations, for 
example, are learned too easily, they will result in behavior that has negative 
consequences. 
An example of this type involves egg recognition in birds that are subject to 
host parasitism. There are avian species, such as the European Cuckoo (Cucu-
lus canorus) or the Brown-headed Cowbird (Molothrus ater), that lay their eggs 
in the nests of other species. Some of these hosts learn what their own eggs look 
like and then reject eggs that are too different (Lotem et al., 1995). However, 
there are potential costs associated with rejection. Rejection may result in dam-
age to one’s own eggs and there may be mistakes in identification. Therefore, 
we might expect that decisions of whether or not to reject eggs will be affected 
by environmental factors, such as the presence of host parasites. This appears 
to be the case (Davies et al., 1996). Taking the argument a step further, we might 
reasonably expect egg recognition to evolve only in species that are subject to 
social parasitism and that would be physically capable of removing the intrud-
ing egg from their nest. 
Phylogenetic history 
Last, and certainly most difficult, is the question of evolutionary history. Recent 
years have seen an exciting approach to this problem emerge. Interestingly, in a 
sense, this represents a return to the roots of ethology. One of the most impor-
tant early papers in gaining acceptance for the study of behavior in biology was 
Lorenz’s comparative study of Anatidae, in which he demonstrated that behav-
ior could be used as a trait in addressing taxonomic issues (Lorenz, 1941). What 
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Lorenz did, in that research, was to use behavioral traits to clarify a phylogeny. 
However, the opposite approach, using well-accepted phylogeny, in the form 
of a cladogram, to clarify the evolutionary history of behavioral traits is what 
we want to emphasize here. 
While the comparative approach described above emphasized the selec-
tion of species for comparative study on the basis of ecology, the phylogenetic 
approach uses criteria based on phylogenetic relationship. As spelled out by 
a number of authors, including Brooks and McLennan (1991; see also Harvey 
and Pagel, 1991; Martins, 1996), the basic procedure is to map the traits of in-
terest on to an existing phylogeny. Then, using the parsimony assumption, it is 
possible to draw inferences about the evolutionary history of the trait. This ap-
proach has been successfully applied to a number of behavioral traits, includ-
ing McLennan’s (Brooks and McLennan, 1991) work with sticklebacks and Ba-
solo’s (1995, 1996) research on sexual selection in Poecilliid fishes. 
 There are two sets of factors that limit the utility of this approach, one set 
general and one more specific to cognitive abilities. The general factors have to 
do with the use of phylogenies. Good phylogenies are often unavailable for spe-
cific groups of animals and this, of course, makes any approach that depends 
on having a phylogeny impossible. In addition, any phylogeny is only a hy-
pothesis, dependent on the characters used to construct it. There are often argu-
ments about which characters are best and there is no universal agreement on 
the best methods of construction. If a comparative analysis is based on an incor-
rect phylogeny, and we never know with certainty that any given phylogeny is 
correct, then it will produce mistaken conclusions. 
The other set of problems concerns measurement of the relevant traits. First 
of all, cladistic analysis is easiest with binary traits and cognitive traits are 
rarely binary. Secondly, as discussed earlier, there are no standard units for the 
measurement of cognitive abilities. Therefore, to be even reasonably confident 
we have found differences in these abilities, we need to use a method of con-
verging operations. 
Although there will always be limits on the methods we use for phyloge-
netic analysis, at least until we have a time machine, we cannot afford to ig-
nore questions of the evolutionary history of cognition. First of all, the results 
of comparative adaptive studies must be evaluated in light of phylogeny (Balda 
and Kamil, De Voogd and Szekely, this volume). Secondly, only a broad phylo-
genetic approach will reveal general trends in the evolution of cognition which 
can give insight into common constraints and patterns of diversification. 
The critical question: integration 
The really important point about Tinbergen’s (1963) article was not just that all 
four questions can be asked and are legitimate, a point in little dispute today, at 
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least among behaviorists. Nor is it that they represent different levels of analy-
sis, not competing alternatives in much dispute among behaviorists. However, 
the really critical point Tinbergen made was that, in the long run, we need to 
integrate these questions and their answers into a coherent whole. An impor-
tant corollary is that the questions complement each other in the sense that an-
swers at one level can inform the search for answers at other levels. 
There are many examples in the contemporary study of behavior that indi-
cate the power of combining levels of analysis, or using information from one 
level to inform research at another level. One of the first comprehensive exam-
ples was the work of Arnold (1981). This research program combined compar-
ative, developmental, behavior genetic and sensory approaches to develop a 
comprehensive picture of the evolution, function and behavioral mechanisms 
of foraging preferences in garter snakes. Another comprehensive example is 
the work of Endler (1980, 1990) of the relationships between sensory processes 
and natural selection. The value of the integrative approach for the study of an-
imal cognition is clearly shown in many of the chapters in this book, including 
work on spatial memory (Clayton and Lee, this volume), on song (De Voogd 
and Szekely, Kroodsma and Byers, this volume), and migration (Bingman et al., 
this volume). 
The advantages of the synthetic approach 
One way we can try to capture the essence of the approach outlined here is to 
look at a table of its characteristics similar to that used by Shettleworth (1993) to 
compare the ecological and anthropocentric programs (Table 2). 
A large advantage of this integrative, Tinbergian approach is that it resolves 
many of the difficulties that have been discussed earlier in this paper. Clearly, 
the integrative approach should eliminate many of the problems associated 
with disciplinary diversity. By including and integrating all four levels of anal-
ysis, most questions about cognition can be accommodated. 
Another advantage of the synthetic approach is that, when viewed within 
the broad synthetic and biological context, the specialized vs. general process 
issue disappears as a divisive issue. In an integrative context, it is clearly a 
misperception to conceive of the distinction between specialized and general 
processes as a dichotomy. It is instructive here to look at nonbehavioral sys-
tems. In a wide variety of physiological cases, for example, there are general 
processes, but the exact nature and details of these processes often vary enor-
mously within the animal kingdom, or even within the vertebrates or the mam-
mals. That is, even very general physiological and morphological traits and sys-
tems show specialization. 
Consider, for example, the problem of oxygen transport. The delivery of ox-
ygen to the cells of the body is an essential, general problem facing many ani-
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mals. In many invertebrates, oxygen is simply carried in solution in the blood 
or hemolymph. However, in many animals, and in almost all of the vertebrates, 
respiratory pigments, special compounds containing metals, are used as ox-
ygen carriers (Schmidt-Nielsen, 1990). There are a number of different respi-
ratory pigments in animals, distributed very systematically across the animal 
kingdom. In vertebrates, hemoglobin is almost universal, but there are still im-
portant differences. For example, the Bohr effect (the acid sensitivity) of hemo-
globin varies widely in mammals as a function of body size, and mammals liv-
ing at higher elevations show greater oxygen dissociation (affinity for oxygen) 
than those living at lower elevations. The point here is that, although hemo-
globin may represent a general process for oxygen transport, this does not mean 
that it is identical in all animals, all vertebrates or even all mammals. Similar 
examples are widespread in terms of organs: lungs, hearts, kidneys. Even very 
general processes show clear evidence of specialization. Therefore, it is not use-
ful to conceptualize biological processes and this includes cognition, as belong-
ing to one of two categories, general or specialized. Even in the case of the most 
general processes, we should expect some specializations to have evolved. 
There are some particularly interesting and difficult problems that need to 
be resolved around the issue of the relationship between general process on 
the one hand and specialization, especially in the sense of serving specific func-
tion, on the other. One issue is whether or not a cognitive ability that evolved 
in one context can be expressed in another. On the one hand, selection acts on 
specific outcomes. Thus, for example, any mechanism that improved the ability 
of a Clark’s Nutcracker to remember its cache locations could be selected for, 
whether or not that mechanism improved other aspects of the cognitive abilities 
of nutcrackers, spatial or nonspatial. On the other hand, pleiotropic effects are 
not uncommon and the results of our comparative studies of spatial memory in 
seed-caching corvids shows that, in this case at least, selective effects seem to 
have been general, at least within the domain of spatial memory or cognition. 
Table 2. Characteristics of the Synthetic Approach
Characteristic Synthetic program
Purpose Use cognitive approach to increase integrative  
  understanding of animals and humans
Phenomena analyzed Any behavior where cognitive approach  
  is useful
Species compared Chosen on basis of considerations of  
  adaptation and phylogeny
Relationship to neuroscience Inclusive
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Another issue is whether or not certain problems are so ubiquitous that, 
once they have given rise to a process, that process persists. There are physical 
adaptations, such as warm bloodedness or feathers, whose phylogeny demon-
strates that this is quite possible. One of the possible advantages of the cogni-
tive approach is that this approach suggests that, at least at some levels of anal-
ysis, this may be the case. As Gallistel (1990) has pointed out, certain problems 
- representing time and space, and detecting causation in the flow of events, 
for example - are indeed ubiquitous and this may help understand widespread 
similarities in spatial information processing and associative learning. In this 
context, Gallistel (1992) has formulated an interesting model for classical con-
ditioning based on the assumption that treats the classical conditioning process 
as a computational mechanism evolved to solve a distinct learning problem: ex-
tracting information from a multivariate, non stationary time series. 
The place of the anthropocentric approach 
One view that is not easily accommodated within the synthetic approach is the 
“animal model” anthropocentric view, the approach that is oriented towards 
using animals as model systems for understanding humans. This view is so 
nonbiological that it is hard to see how it could fit. Consider this quotation: 
“The comparative psychology of cognition follows directly from the theory of 
evolution. As Darwin (1871) observed, it is ‘highly probable that with mankind 
the intellectual faculties have been mainly and gradually perfected through nat-
ural selection’ (p. 160),” (Terrace, 1993). This is a very clear statement in favor 
of taking an evolutionary view of cognition. 
However, the peculiar thing about the anthropocentric approach is that, 
while it accepts the general Darwinian-based point of continuity between hu-
mans and other animals, it seems to accept very little else about the Darwinian 
perspective. For example, Terrace (1993) reviews studies of series learning in pi-
geons and monkeys. The main reason that Terrace is interested in this paradigm 
is to discover the properties of serial learning in the absence of language, as if 
the only important difference between pigeons and humans, or even monkeys 
and humans, is language. Another indication of the nonbiological thinking typ-
ical of this approach is the use of the word phylogeny. Terrace concludes that 
serial learning “… appears to be phylogenetically quite old” (p. 162). However, 
comparative biologists understand the dangers in using comparisons among so 
few disparate species to make such assertions. Although Terrace’s research on 
serial learning is well executed and clever, and has produced interesting results 
that are informative about animal cognition, it is clearly not Darwinian in the 
contemporary sense of the term. 
Although the anthropocentric approach may have its successes, it is inher-
ently limited as long as it fails to take into account the biological nature of the 
animals that are studied. Wasserman (1997) has recently suggested that the an-
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thropocentric and ecological-evolutionary approaches need not be viewed as 
conflicting with one another because each asks a different question. He argues 
that “… the parallel use of both strategies should make for a powerful and com-
plementary alliance for the future study of animal cognition” (Wasserman, 
1997, p. 128). While the potential does exist for such an alliance, it will require 
both schools to be sophisticated about both evolutionary and proximate, mech-
anistic factors (just as Tinbergen suggested in 1963). 
It is important to realize that, although it is not human-centered, the syn-
thetic approach is relevant to understanding human cognition. Certainly, the 
study of cognitive processes in animals should contribute to our understand-
ing of human cognition. However, this is more likely to develop if we under-
stand cognition in a broader, more biological framework than that typically 
used by proponents of the anthropocentric approach. In this context, there is 
another version of the anthropocentric approach which is more in accord with 
the synthetic approach. This version uses comparative strategies with humans 
and closely related primates to try to understand how human abilities evolved 
(e.g. Povinelli, 1993). 
Many examples of the advantages of such a framework can be found. For 
example, medical research has certainly utilized the “animal model,” anthropo-
centric approach quite heavily, and with success. None the less, recent work on 
“Darwinian medicine” has shown that even more insight can be gained by ap-
plying Darwinian ideas to the study of many topics in medicine, including epi-
demiology, pregnancy, host-parasite interactions, and infectious disease (Nesse 
and Williams, 1991; Ewald, 1994). 
Other potential examples come from the emerging field of evolutionary 
psychology (Barkow et al., 1992). One interesting example of how a broad evo-
lutionary approach might be applied to human cognition comes from studies 
of social cognition. It has been hypothesized that one of the arenas for the evo-
lution of intelligence has been the social arena (e.g. Humphrey, 1976; Cheney 
and Seyfarth, 1990). In that case, one might expect that humans could solve so-
cial problems most readily. There is also evidence that, when the same logi-
cal problem is presented in a social context, people find it easier to solve than 
when the same logical problem is presented in an abstract, nonsocial context 
(Cosmides, 1989). 
Conclusions 
This chapter has outlined a general research program for the study of cognition 
in animals, an approach which the following chapters of this book demonstrate 
is well under way. This program synthesizes two scientific research programs, 
the cognitive and the ethological. It applies the approach exemplified by Niko 
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Tinbergen, emphasizing the importance of studying evolutionary and mecha-
nistic levels of explanation in a single, integrative framework, to the study of 
cognition. What should this approach be called? There are many possibilities, 
some of which are listed below. 
Comparative cognition? 
One label that is sometimes used for animal cognitive work is comparative cog-
nition, but it is not appropriate for the approach outlined here. Not all work 
called for in the synthetic approach needs be comparative; much will not be. 
Furthermore, current usage of the phrase is inappropriate. It has, for many, 
come to refer to the anthropocentric approach, emphasizing using information 
about human cognitive processes in the design of animal studies of cognition. 
Cognitive ecology? 
Another approach has been labeled cognitive ecology. Real (1993; also Dukas, 
1998) has popularized this term, and used it in a manner very similar to much 
of what has been proposed here. However, the term ecology implies an exclu-
sively adaptive, functional approach, and tends to de-emphasize mechanistic 
and ontogenetic levels of analysis as well as considerations of phylogeny. 
Evolutionary cognition? Cognitive biology? 
The potential list goes on and on. However, it seems obvious that, in terms of 
the basic philosophy of the approach and the methods it gives rise to, there 
is only one appropriate label for this field: cognitive ethology. This label suc-
cinctly captures the two approaches being synthesized, giving appropriate rec-
ognition to its historical precursors. 
There is only one reason not to adopt this label: it has been pre-empted by 
Don Griffin and others (e.g. Griffin, 1976, 1978; Ristau, 1991; Bekoff and Allen, 
1997), defining cognitive ethology in terms of subjective experience: awareness, 
consciousness, etc. Many of us working on animal cognition find this term ob-
jectionable for many reasons; so objectionable that we completely avoid using 
the term. One of the reasons it is objectionable is that much of the argument 
has focused on attempting to prove the existence of these internal states and 
the nature of some of these arguments is unacceptable. In particular, many of 
Griffin’s arguments are so weak and anecdotal that they remind one of nothing 
more than Paley’s (1851) arguments for the existence of a creator, natural theol-
ogy based on the argument from design (Blumberg and Wasserman, 1995). 
However, this dislike for Griffin’s definition does nothing to diminish the 
fact that cognitive ethology is the most historically appropriate label for the ap-
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proach outlined here. If workers in this field adopt the term cognitive ethology, 
a new definition will replace Griffin’s. If this takes place, it will challenge those 
who hold to Griffin’s definition to become a subfield of cognitive ethology, con-
fronting the Lakatos definition of a progressive research program. Including 
postulated internal states in models of behavior is nothing new nor is it objec-
tionable. The test of such models is not truth but usefulness. Do they generate 
new predictions or insights which have utility? This is the challenge which the 
proponents of animal awareness must meet. The issue is not proving that ani-
mals have minds, it is demonstrating that making the awareness (or conscious-
ness) assumption leads to exciting new questions and discoveries. 
Meanwhile, the term cognitive ethology should be adopted to describe the 
field that synthesizes the Darwinian perspective of Tinbergen and contempo-
rary ethology with the cognitive perspective of psychology. Maybe, in the long 
run, the difference between assuming animals have internal representations 
and assuming they have awareness is relatively minor. Future research should 
determine this issue. Scientists adopting a synthetic approach to animal cogni-
tion would do well to settle on the term cognitive ethology for the broad, bio-
logical study of cognitive processes. Cognitive ethology is the phrase that most 
accurately and appropriately describes the science that many of us do. 
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